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Disaster has many faces. The effect of similar
circumstancesflood for examplecan influence
the lives of peasants in Bangladesh in a way
which is entirely different to the way it might
affect Mississippi farmers. The one has little to
lose but is left destitute, the other with much
more at stake is unlikely to suffer noticeably.
In this paper I am considering the interface of
people in the developing world with the extreme
situation caused by natural or man-made catas-
trophe other than war. People are the essential
ingredient. Without people, there is no disaster
in this interpretation. Disasters arise from earth-
quake, flood or hurricane which create immediate
change in the environment or through the gradual
development of an erosive situation such as famine
or epidemic. Such situations demand total inte-
gration and coordination of all life support sys-
tems available to the responsible administrators,
including any which may be provided from ex-
ternal sources through international, bilateral, or
charitable aid. My research has concentrated on
the role of the administration in maintaining life
support systems in the post-disaster situation.
That is, the requirements for food, water, medical
aid and shelter and the communication and trans-
portation systems upon which provision of these
depends. It is clear from the case studies which
I have been able to make of a number of different
disaster types in different continents that the role
of the administration is of paramount import-
ance. Natural catastrophes will continue to cause
death and damage into the foreseeable future but
it is possible now for administrators in disaster-
prone developing countries to initiate action
which will mitigate the effects of disaster upon
the populations for whom they have responsi-
bility, and to help ensure the maintenance of
essential life support systems. This action is the
process of pre-disaster planning which would
define the threats and their probability, assess the
vulnerability of communities and essential services
and allocate responsibility, authority, and re-
sources so that a sound state of Disaster Pre-
paredness can be created.
Unhappily the indications are that in very few
of the developing countries threatened does any
state of effective preparedness exist. This is evi-
dent from surveys carried out by the League of
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Red Cross Societies and the United Nations.
There are also grounds for supposing that in many
other circumstances, where plans do exist, these
are little more than documents with neither the
machinery nor the resources to permit their im-
plementation.
Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness and
concern throughout the world, of the occurence
and effects of disaster upon the world's poor.
Although the General Assembly of the United
Nations talked of the need to do something for
many years it was not until 1972 that a UN
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator with a small staff
(UNDRO) was set up in Geneva. Judith Hart
established a Disaster Unit within the Ministry of
Overseas Development in 1974. The League of
Red Cross Societies, the national and international
charities, US AID through the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance, and other UN agencies, in-
cluding UNDP, have of course been involved in
disaster for many years. All have one factor in
common. By far the greater part of their available
resources is allocated to relief activities. This, in
spite of the fact that the weight of the available
evidence indicates that the most effective and cost-
effective means of mitigating the effects of disaster
lies in improving standards of pre-disaster plan-
ing and preparedness and management of re-
sources when disaster strikes.
A similar imbalance exists in the field of disaster
research. Here too the greater proportion of
money and effort is devoted to scientific research
into examination of the natural phenomena and to
technological work related to emergency shelter
and sanitation. This may lead to better standards
of prediction, although success demands great
investment in technology and in human resources.
Nevertheless the usefulness of prediction and warn-
ings is entirely dependent upon a government's
ability to effect action and a peoples' willingness
to comply. Again we have returned to the essen-
tial ingredientpeople. Crying 'Wolf' is not a
story about bad prediction. It is a story about
human failings and poor communications anal-
ogous to many disaster situations.
In most activities guidelines for action are evolved
from study and experience. In disaster manage-
ment we know far too little about what has hap-
pened and has gone wrong in the past. Useful
data is extremely difficult to find for a variety of
reasons, but principally because little effort has
been made to identify the requirement and to
collect the information. Realising this some two
years ago, the Disaster Research Unit at Brad-
ford University in conjuction with the Department
of Administrative Studies, Manchester University,
proposed to the United Nations Disaster Relief
Co-ordinator that he should use our combined
resources to mount a data-collecting exercise at
some future disaster occurrence, as quickly after
the event as possible. The objectives would be the
identification of sources and channels of informa-
tion within, and outside, the striken country, con-
cerning relief requirements, available relief re-
sources within the striken country, and in neigh-
bouring ones, methods of control and allocation
of relief requirements, how and when planning
for rehabilitation, reconstruction and redevelop-
ment began.
These are only some examples of the sort of in-
formation which might provide a basis upon
which sound disaster preparedness and disaster
management could be framed. As yet no proper
plan has been made to collect this information or
to disseminate it.
Study of the information requirements of pre-
disaster planning and of development planning, in
the poorer and disaster-prone countries, reveals
interesting comparisons. These relate to popula-
tion distribution, health and education, agricul-
tural economy and practices, trade and profes-
sional skills, infrastructure, topography, climate
and many more. Investment in the collection of
information necessary for the one provides data
essential to the other.
There is a clear and easily identified relationship
between the effects of disaster and development
projects. It has been shown, although the data
upon which the cases are based are of dubious
quality, that in the poorer of the disaster-prone
developing countries, growth, and by assumption,
standards of living, is not only retarded but is
declining due to the recurrent effects of natural
catastrophe. Some of the best evidence appears
in a study 'Famine and Famine Policies: Some
Empirical Evidence' by N. S. Jodha in the
Indian Economic and Political Weekly dated
October 18 1975. Although the sample is small
and somewhat concentrated in time and in space,
Jodha provides good evidence of the way in
which living standards were affected by recurrent
drought in a number of Indian villages. The study
is of great value to the administrator because it
identifies a number of useful pointers by which
the onset of shortages resulting from poor harvest
can be identified and the consequences of
delaying the provision of relief, once a general
picture has indicated the need for it.
Not nearly enough useful research of this kind is
being done outside India. We know that disaster
results in displaced persons who are deprived of
their livelihoods and who must be provided with
food, water, shelter and medical care. But we
know very little of the implications of doing so
for people who have lived their lives on the bor-
der between hunger and starvation and for whom
even small changes of circumstances imply
destitution. We know how best to supply the
necessities of life but little of the best way to
provide them to people who are destitute.
A more subtle, interesting and in some ways
significant relationship can be identified however,
between development strategies and the proneness
to disaster which these sometimes create. This
subject has been dealt with in Towards an Ex-
planation and Reduction of Disaster Proneness
(A. Baird et al, August 1975, University of Brad-
ford). The paper explains the increase in disaster
awareness throughout the world resulting not only
from improved communications but through
poor social policies, pressure on land and less than
comprehensive development strategies which con-
centrate large numbers of the world's under-
privileged at risk in disaster prone areas (Bangla-
desh, the slums of Managua and Guatamala cities)
or on land which is only marginally suited to
agriculture (the Sahelian areas of Africa and in
Ethiopia) and where minimal changes in climate
and agricultural practice can cause disaster through
famine. The paper argues that the occurence of
major disasters is on the increase as shown in
Figure 1.
An example may be seen in the following
hypothesis. It can be assumed that through im-
proved animal husbandry and health over the last
20 to 30 years, herds in Ethiopia, in the Sahel and
in parts of India have increased in size. In some
areas, West Africa among them, this increase has
resulted from demands for greater supplies of
meat, but in some cases at least, the larger herds
have only made greater demands on the available
land without corresponding outlets for animal
products having been created. To meet the de-
mand for water for these herds, technology pro-
vided tube wells making nomadic farmers less
dependent upon surface water and its conserva-
tion. Cisterns and tanks which had been kept in
repair for generations fell out of use. Improve-
ments in water supplies were not matched by
improvements in the available grazing: grazing
areas became wider and over-grazing became a
problem. At the same time the administrative
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boundaries of the colonial era, which did not
inhibit migratory grazing, were being replaced
by more rigid political boundaries. Areas which
were only marginally and seasonally suitable for
grazing were being over-grazed. Any reduction
in rainfall caused these to fail and when this
happened herds began to concentrate on areas
served by tube wells and such of the surface
water sources as remained in use. Very rapidly
areas were grazed out and herdsmen moved
south to areas which although only marginally
suitable were under agriculture.
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I suggest that the Sahelian famine was the result,
not of climatic change and drought, but of
unco-ordinated development and pressure upon
land unsuited to the demands placed upon it.
It can be seen that the catastrophic event places
strains upon an administration which, unless it
has made preparations to meet disaster, will
cause it to fail through its inability to meet the
demands placed upon it and to deploy the re-
sources available to it. In the case of drought
and shortage almost the converse is true. If
famine develops it is the result of the administra-
tion's failures before the event. The drought has
acted as a catalyst, producing disaster from a
series of administrative failures and poor agri-
cultural policies and practices, leading up to the
event. It is also interesting that famine is the
disaster which it is most difficult for a government
to accept and having done so, for which to seek
aid. No criticism is implied from deaths due to
earthquake, hurricane or flood (the "Acts of
God") even though these may result from inade-
quate housing, land use and social policies, but
famine holds its implied criticism of government
though the victims suffer through no fault of their
own other than their existence in circumstances of
poverty.
We have now set a scene in which the weight
of responsibility in disaster has been placed upon
the shoulders of a country's administrators. What
are the implications of this? Several proposals
have already been made, including that Disaster
Task Forces might be provided by either NATO,
Sweden or the Commonwealth. The idea has
attractions and severe limitations. Perhaps the
NATO force could provide the most effective
and integrated body but could it operate outside
NATO countries? Would it be acceptable in
Africa or in South East Asia? Could it get to
Central or South America quickly enough to be
effective and would the USA accept assistance
in an area where her influence and assistance in
disaster is a firm part of her foreign policy and
has been effective and immediate, if expensive, in
the past? The Commonwealth is so far-flung as
to make integration, concentration and command
of a Commonwealth Disaster Task Force difficult
to organise. Happily the South Pacific can rely
on rapid assistance from Australia and New
Zealand or the USA when disaster strikes, making
the need for more formal and highly organised
forces hardly necessary.
The idea of a Disaster Task Force implies the
employment of existing military forces because
any separately recruited, organised and equipped
force would be precluded by cost. Furthermore,
my own research shows, and this is supported
by the Red Cross, that foreign military forces
are increasingly unacceptable as assistance in
disaster, except, perhaps, in the case of US mili-
tary assistance to Central American Republics
and more generally to service ships and aircraft
transporting aid or carrying evacuees. There is
even a recent example of a solitary medical soldier
being unacceptable as an adviser in the erection
and operation of a field hospital supplied as
disaster aid, and offers of service, communication
and transportation advisors have been unaccept-
able even within the Commonwealth to help in
the rehabilitation of the striken country's infra-
structure. Other proposals have related to the
provision of teams of expert administrators. This
presumes either, that these administrators are
given executive authority to produce order out of
chaos in disaster, or alternatively, that there is
an effective administraion on to which they would
be grafted when necessary. Both assumptions are
based on improbabilities. A poor administration
is unlikely to abandon its authority in any cir-
cumstances and an effective administration is
more likely to have established some degree of
disaster preparedness. In either case it is unlikely,
except in the case of the slow moving famine-
type disaster, that new administrators would be
able to influence a situation quickly enough to
be effective. My previous comments on the causes
of famine qualify the probability of administrative
advisers being acceptable in such cases.
This brings me to a third and perhaps more
useful possibility. I have already indicated the
importance of the role of the administration in
maintaining life support systems and in mitigating
the effects of disaster by establishing a sound state
of disaster preparedness. Nevertheless, at present,
the training of administrators in disaster-prone
developing countries does not include this subject.
lt is true that the USA holds a Disaster Prepared-
ness Seminar for Disaster Co-ordinators from de-
veloping countries from all over the world at two-
year intervals. But this seminar is held in the
United States and relates to US problems and
resources, which at least some of the participants
find irrelevant: as one recently said to me. "They
talked of helicopters and I thought about don-
keys"!
The Department of Administrative Studies for
Overseas Visiting Fellows of Manchester Uni-
versity has made proposals for an alternative
course of action to the UN, the Commonwealth
Secretariat, the League of Red Cross Societies,
the UK Ministry for Overseas Development and
others. This would expand the current training of
administrators, particularly in the disaster-prone
developing countries, to embrace pre-disaster
planning, disaster preparedness and management.
The objectives of this training would be:
study and practice in situation analysis and in
the planning processes related to disaster vulner-
ability and disaster preparedness;
training, through practice in syndicate exercises,
in the problems and techniques of crisis (disaster)
management and resource deployment;
study of the relationship between development
strategies and disaster and of the special problems
of disaster proneness in communities.
It is proposed that this training should take place
on a regional (e.g. Caribbean, East African, South
Pacific) basis, in universities and colleges where
administrative training currently takes place.
Disaster training organised in this way would have
the following advantages:
it would indicate that disaster responsibilities
are a natural extension of the administrator's
routine responsibilities;
disaster problems would be studied against the
background of a common regional concept of the
disaster threat; earthquake, hurricane, drought
etc.
those studying together from one region would
be from similar cultures, with similar experience
and attitudes to disaster and from countries at
similar stages of economic, political and social
development;
regional cooperation would be engendered by
the study of similar problems and by the realisa-
tion that the employment of national and regional
resources is likely to provide the most rapid,
effective and appropriate aid in disaster;
being based on existing regional institutions, a
programme of this kind would create the capa-
bility, within these institutions, to develop and
maintain training of this kind as an on-going
element of their curricula.
Through programmes which develop administra-
tive competence to plan for and to manage
disaster situations, we can hope to ensure that
indigenous and regional resources are employed
and deployed rapidly when required. It is also
reasonable to assume that, if the machinery to
manage national resources exists, then the massive
influx of foreign aid, which frequently follows
disaster in developing countries, will be integrated
and coordinated as the situation demands. It is
also more probable that the requirements for
foreign aid will be defined realistically and rapidly
so that foreign donors can react in the best way.
Implementation of a world-wide disaster education
and training programme of this kind would pro-
vide a rapid and extremely cost-effective means
of improving world standards of disaster pre-
paredness. At present the United Nations Disaster
Relief Office (UNDRO) engages a few consul-
tants each year who spend about six months
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examining a country's problems and provide a
report. Their recommendations are not always
either accepted or implemented. Progress by this
means is slow and on a narrow front and has very
limited effectiveness.
The UK Ministry of Overseas Development looks
upon those proposals for education and training
favourably, seeing these as major factors in the
development of disaster preparedness. But policy
inhibits the Ministry from offering training in this
way and maintains an attitude of customer orien-
tation, ready to act as circumstances demand. It
has been left to the League of Red Cross Societies
and to the Commonwealth Secretariat to take
initiatives. In September 1976 they jointly spon-
sored a Disaster Relief and Preparedness seminar
for the territories of the South Pacific. This was
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successful in that it caused these territories to see
the importance and relevance of their own re-
sources in disaster and should result in a course
at the University of the South Pacific for those
with principal responsibilities for pre-disaster
planning in these territories.
The opportunity exists now for the industrialised
and rich nations of the world to take initiatives
through existing agencies such as the UN, the
EEC and the Commonwealth Secretariat or
through bilateral technical assistance programmes
which would provide the means of developing
indigenous resources in developing countries to
ensure the rapid and co-ordinated deployment of
relief, so that the distress resulting from disaster
would be effectively mitigated through Disaster
Preparedness.
